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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
This is a permissive appeal arising from two interlocutory orders entered by the 
district court during Erick Hall's capital post-conviction proceedings: 1) the district 
court's order prohibiting post-conviction contact with the jurors who deliberated in the 
underlying criminal case; and 2) the district court's order denying Mr. Hall's motion for a 
court-ordered deposition of his trial counsels' investigator, Glenn Elarn. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
With the exception of a few additions and corrections to the State's recitation of 
facts, Mr. Hall relies on the relevant facts and course of proceedings as set forth in his 
opening brief. (Appellant's Brief, pp.I-4.) 
The Order Prohibiting Juror Contact 
The State suggests that the issue of jury contact arose in the context of post-
conviction discovery litigation. (Respondent's Brief, p.3 ("While Hall's discovery 
motions were being litigated, an informal telephone conference was held January 6, 2006, 
regarding the release of juror questionnaire forms .... ").) However, the issue actually 
arose in the context of a stipulated motion for the disclosure of completed jury 
questionnaires, not discovery. (Appellant's Brief, pp.l-4.) Indeed, Mr. Hall filed a 
separate motion for discovery that had not yet been litigated and did not involve either a 
request for jury questionnaires or jury contact. (R. 35055 Vol. I, pp. 78-1 09.) It is 
misleading for the State to link the litigation of matters of discovery with the litigation of 
matters involving jury contact. Indeed, the State relies on this mischaracterization as 
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support for the district court's order which extended an element of the post-conviction 
discovery standard to matters involving jury contact. 
Addressing the district court's analysis of Mr. Hall's request for jury contact, the 
State correctly notes that the district court repeatedly expressed concems regarding 
potential harassment of the jurors. (Respondent's Brief, pp.3-5.) Notably missing from 
the State's recitation of facts, however, is the fact that the district court repeatedly stated 
its perception of the propriety of post-verdict juror interviews had been shaped by a 
negative experience it had with an allegedly unethical rogue investigator sometime in 
1995 or 1996, an investigator unassociated with Mr. Hall, his case, his post-conviction 
counsel, or the State Appellate Public Defender. (Tr. 6/15107, p.21, L.5 - p.25, L.3; Tr. 
8/08/07, p.l23, L.8 - p.l28, L.23.) Moreover, the State fails to note that the district court 
never found, or even alleged, that Mr. Hall's post-conviction counselor their agents had 
engaged in any improper or unethical conduct. 
The Order Denying The Deposition OfMr. Hall's Investigator 
The State implies that Mr. Hall conceded his request to depose trial counsels' 
investigator, Glenn Elarn, was not relevant to claims raised in his petition. (Respondent's 
Brief, p.2 ("Hall conceded some of his initial discovery requests were not "specifically" 
related to claims in his Amended Petition (UPCPA, exhibit 10, pp.3-4, 13, 16-18), but 
renewed his request to depose Elarn (id., p.20) .... ").) The State implies that Mr. Hall 
conceded in his discovery memorandum that his request to depose Mr. Elarn was not 
relevant to claims in his petition; such an implication is false. While Mr. Hall did 
concede that a limited number of his discovery requests were not specifically related to 
claims raised in his petition, those discovery requests are not the subject of this appeal. 
2 
Significantly, the State omits the fact that Mr. Hall identified multiple claims related to 
his motion to depose Mr. Elam. (R. 35055, Exhibit 10, pp.20-21.)! Thus, contrary to the 
State's mischaracterization of the record, Mr. Hall identified specific claims to which Mr. 
Elam's testimony would be relevant and necessary. 
! The referenced claims appear in volume 2 of the record on appeal at page 306 ("Trial 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to adequately investigate and 
present evidence of an alternate perpetrator of the murder and co-perpetrator of the 
rape."), and page 312 (same). 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court's order forbidding any communications with jurors 
unless Mr. Hall can first demonstrate that such communications are necessary to 
protect his substantial rights, violates his rights under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution? 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by forbidding Mr. Hall's attorneys 
and their agents from contacting jurors? 
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Hall's motion for a 
court-ordered deposition of his trial counsels' investigator where the investigator 
could provide information relevant to his post-conviction claims but was 
unwilling to voluntarily provide an affidavit? 
The State "wishes to rephrase" the issues. (Respondent's Brief, p.6.) The State 
rephrases the issues as a pretext for arguing the issues, e.g., that Mr. Hall requested 
"unbridled" interviews with jurors. (Respondent's Brief, p.6.) However, a request for 
"unbridled" interviews is not an issue on appeal. (Appellant's Brief, pp.l2-15 (identifying 
the "safeguards" already in place to prevent unbridled interviews in conjunction with Mr. 
Hall's "proposed list of general topics and specific questions for jurors who were willing 
to discuss their service .... ").) Further, by rephrasing the issues, the State omits in its 
entirety Mr. Hall's first issue, despite conceding elsewhere that Mr. Hall's constitutional 
claims were properly preserved below and raised on appeal. (Respondent's Brief, pp.19-
26.) Finally, the State actually rearranges the order ofthe issues, making it unnecessarily 
difficult to track the parties' positions on the issues. 
For all these reasons, the State's restatement of the "issues" constitutes an abuse 
of the Court's rules governing the content and arrangement of a Respondent's Brief, and 
at a minimum, is argumentative and confusing. See LA.R. 35(b). Accordingly, Mr. Hall 
hereinafter will continue to follow the arrangement and statement of the issues on appeal 




The District Court's Order Forbidding Any Communications With Jurors Unless Mr. Han 
Can First Demonstrate That Such Communications Are Necessary To Protect His 
Substantial Rights, Violates Mr. Han's Rights Guaranteed By The First, Fifth, Eighth, 
And Fourteenth Amendments To The United States Constitution 
A. Introduction And Standard Of Review 
Without any evidence of unprofessional conduct by either party, the district court 
took the unprecedented measure of creating a rule governing jury contact in capital post-
conviction proceedings. Mr. Han argues that the district court's order imposed a prior 
restraint in violation of the First Amendment, impeded Mr. Hall's post-conviction 
investigation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and eliminated an 
important procedural safeguard against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the 
death penalty in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
While the State addresses each of Mr. Hall's constitutional claims, the State 
asserts that this Court should apply an abuse of discretion standard of review. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.l8.) Presumably the State misstates the standard of review 
because it merges Mr. Hall's first two issues, which involve different standards of review. 
However, Mr. Hall maintains that the correct standard of review when assessing the 
constitutionality of the district court's order is de novo. See State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 
197, 969 P .2d 244, 246 (1998) ("Where this Court considers a claim that a statute is 
unconstitutional, we review the trial court's ruling de novo since it involves purely a 
question oflaw."). 
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B. The District Court's Order Forbidding Any Communications With Jurors 
Unless Mr. Hall Can First Demonstrate That Such Communications Are 
Necessary To Protect His Substantial Rights, Violates Mr.· Hall's Rights 
Guaranteed By The First, Fifth, Eighth, And Fourteenth Amendments To The 
United States Constitution 
1. The District Court's Order Constitutes An Unconstitutional Prior Restraint 
In Violation Of Mr. Hall's First Amendment Rights 
The State seems to claim that the district court's actions do not constitute a "prior 
restraint" on speech, and that the standard for assessing the constitutionality of 
restrictions on attorney speech set forth in Gentile v. State Bar o/Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 
1075 (1991), does not apply to post-verdict attorney speech. (Respondent's Brief, pp.19-
20.) The State provides no relevant authority for this claim. Indeed, most of the cases 
cited by the State pre-date Gentile, and even those cases recognize that attorney speech, 
whether occurring before or after a verdict, is entitled to First Amendment protections. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.20-21 (citing Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233 
(lOth Cir. 1986); Haeberle v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 739 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1984)).) 
Indeed, these cases do little more than hold what the Supreme Court subsequently 
recognized in Gentile, i.e., that the media is generally given greater First Amendment 
protection than attorneys, a far cry however from providing no protection at all. Notably, 
the primary case relied upon by the State released after Gentile, applied the Gentile 
analysis to post-verdict communications between a lawyer and jurors. (Respondent's 
Brief, p.20 (citing Commission/or Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 431 
(Tex. 1998).) 
The State relies on Haeberle v. Texas Int'l Airlines, supra, in part, for the 
proposition that "courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect its 
processes from prejudicial outside influences." (Respondent's Brief, p.20.) Mr. Hall 
6 
asserts that the additional "steps" taken by the district court were unnecessary and 
unconstitutional. Indeed, as previously demonstrated, this Court has already taken at 
least three steps to protect jurors from harmful and prejudicial outside influences. (See 
Appellant's Brief, p.9 ("This Court has created and adopted a series of rules and 
instructions designed to afford the flexibility required to further the State's interests 
including the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, the Idaho Rules of Evidence, and the 
Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions."); pp.l2-15 (addressing the specific rules and 
regulations already in place under Idaho law).) The State completely fails to address any 
of the safeguards already set in place by this Court. Indeed, the State makes no reference 
at all to the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and only a single reference to the Idaho 
Criminal Jury Instructions. 
The State asserts that the district court created an appropriate additional rule for 
governing a lawyer's post-verdict communications with jurors. Under the district court's 
rule, before initiating any contact with jurors, capital post-conviction counsel must first 
demonstrate to the presiding court that juror interviews are necessary to protect the 
petitioner's substantial rights. While this rule is reminiscent of the standards governing 
post-conviction discovery, it is actually much more onerous. 
Post-conviction discovery is generally discretionary; however, if a petitioner can 
demonstrate that discovery is necessary to protect his substantial interests, then discovery 
is mandatory. See Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 21 P.3d 924 (2001). The district 
court applied the standard for mandating the disclosure of requested discovery to requests 
for permission to contact jurors. However, even the cases cited by the State do not 
require such a substantial showing, instead generally adopting a "good cause" standard. 
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See State v. Marshall, 690 A.2d 1,97 (N.J. 1997) ("The compelling public interest in 
protecting jurors and their deliberations amply justifies the restriction on contacting them 
without good cause."); Gagliano v. Ford Motor Co., 551 F.Supp. 1077, 1079 (D. Kansas 
1982) ("Lawyers ... shall refrain from approaching jurors who have completed a case, 
unless authorized by the Court. Such authorization will be considered only upon formal 
application to the Court and hearing at which just cause shall be shown."). Similarly, the 
State cites United States v. Cleveland, 1997 WL 412466 (E.D. La. 1997). While the 
Cleveland case does not explicitly identify the standard in that federal district for 
justifYing post-verdict jury contact, by footnote, the court cited the relevant local rules. 
fd. at * I n.2. The current version of those rules provide, in relevant part, that, "[nlo 
party or their attorney shall, personally or through another person, contact, interview, 
examine or question any juror or alternate or any relative, friend or associate thereof, 
except on leave of court granted upon good cause shown." Uniform Local Rules in the 
Eastern, Middle, and Western Districts of Louisiana, LR 47.5M & W (Adopted March 
26,2001). 
The State asserts that the district court's order will further the State's interest in 
"preventing post-verdict juror harassment," and that, without such order, the incidence of 
post-verdict juror interviews "will become common knowledge among jurors" and thus 
"affect jurors' behavior in deliberations." (Respondent's Brief, p.22.) However, as noted 
previously, there is no evidence at all that Mr. Hall's counsel, or their agents, would 
harass the jurors. Indeed, Mr. Hall's counsel has an ethical obligation to avoid 
harassment of jurors. In addition, as previously demonstrated, the Court's jury 
instructions in conjunction with the Idaho Rules of Evidence further minimize the risk of 
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any harassment. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 12-15.) Moreover, there is no evidence that 
Idaho's experience of allowing post-verdict juror interviews over the past several decades 
has in any way undermined the criminal justice system or adversely affected Idahoans 
willingness to serve as jurors. Indeed, in the absence of a rule or statute forbidding juror 
contact, Idaho district courts have generally permitted post-verdict communications with 
jurors without incident, and in some cases, have encouraged the investigation of potential 
juror claims. For example, in State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 922 P.2d 960 (1991), the 
district court actually authorized the defense to hire an investigator for the purpose of 
conducting juror interviews. In short, the admissibility of juror affidavits from such 
interviews is a matter that Idaho district courts, as well as Idaho appellate courts, have 
historically addressed without diminishing the sanctity of juror deliberations, or 
otherwise undermining the public's confidence in the judicial system. 
The State also again appears to claim that attorney speech is not protected by the 
First Amendment. (Respondent's Brief, p.23 ("Hall's reliance on Gentile is misplaced; 
the Court did not conclude the attorney's pre-trial statements were protected speech.").) 
In effect, the State equates attorney speech with obscenity, when in fact, Gentile stands 
for the very proposition relied upon by Mr. Hall, i.e., that attorney speech is protected 
speech and prior restraints on such speech are unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment unless the speech at issue presents a "substantial likelihood of material 
prejudice." Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075. Mr. Hall's analysis of Gentile is not unique. 
Indeed, the Benton opinion, extensively relied upon by the State provides that, "[ u Jnder 
the rationale of Gentile, the 'substantial likelihood of material prejudice' standard is 
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sufficient protection for attorneys' speech in [the post-verdict] context." Benton, 980 
S. W.2d at 431. As recently summarized by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
In Gentile, the Supreme Court discussed ABA Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct 3.6 (1981), which prohibits attorneys from making extrajudicial 
statements that a reasonable person would expect to be spread through 
public communication if the lawyer knows or should know that making 
the statement was substantially likely to materially prejudice an 
adjudicative proceeding. 111 S.Ct. at 2725. The Court indicated that this 
regulation of attorney speech, as adopted by Nevada, was permissible as it 
can be "[i]nterpreted in a proper and narrow manner" so as to "punish only 
speech that creates a danger of imminent and substantial harm." ld. . . . 
Thus, the Supreme Court has held that attorney speech may be subject to 
diminished First Amendment protection when it is regulated in furtherance 
of a substantial governmental interest. ld. at 2745. 
Hersh v. US. ex reI. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 743, 755-56 (5th Cir. 2008). Indeed, the Fifth 
Circuit's application Gentile in Hersh, demonstrates that the district court's rule violates 
the First Amendment. In Hersh, the court held that a provision of the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act that prohibited attorneys from advising their 
clients to incur debt in contemplation of bankruptcy did not violate an attorney's First 
Amendment rights since it was narrowly construed to prohibit attorneys from giving such 
advice only if the attorney is advising the client to engage in conduct that would be an 
abuse or improper manipulation of the bankruptcy system. ld. at 763. In Mr. Hall's case, 
the district court crafted a rule that cannot be narrowly construed to prohibit only attorney 
speech that would be an abuse or manipulation of jurors or the criminal justice system; 
such rules already exist, but were effectively supplanted by the district court's rule. 
The State reaches the illogical conclusion that simply because the district court 
articulated some of the policies in favor of limiting juror contact, the district court's order 
was necessarily constitutional. (Respondent's Brief, p.23 ("The question was not whether 
Hall's attorneys acted 'unprofessionally if left to their own devices' ... but the policies 
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associated with preventing post-verdict juror interviews as articulated above.").) The 
State's analysis, however, only constitutes half of the constitutional analysis. Where First 
Amendment interests are at stake, this Court has a duty to conduct a searching, 
independent factual review of the full record. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of 
us., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) ("[A]n appellate court has an obligation to 'make an 
independent examination of the whole record' in order to make sure that 'the judgment 
does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.'" (quoting New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-286 (1964»). In the context of attorney 
speech, a prior restraint will pass constitutional muster only if the targeted speech 
presents a "substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding." 
Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075. Rules restricting lawyer speech must only "impose narrow 
and necessary limitations on lawyers' speech." ld. Indeed, the policies supporting the 
government's interests in restricting unbridled speech must be weighed. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.7-19.) As required by Gentile, the First Amendment analysis must consider 
whether the prior restraint imposes narrow and necessary limitations on the speech at 
issue in the course of furthering those polices. 
2. The District Court's Order Violates Mr. Hall's Due Process Right To 
Meaningful PostCConviction Proceedings 
The State assumes for the sake of argument that Mr. Hall is constitutionally 
entitled to "meaningful post-conviction proceedings." (Respondent's Brief, p.24.) The 
remainder of the State's response is essentially non-responsive, focusing on what post-
conviction proceedings are not, as opposed to what post-conviction proceedings are. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.24-25.) Contrary to the State's suggestion, Mr. Hall's claim 
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does not rest on any premise that post-conviction proceedings are broader than that 
recognized by this Court or the United States Supreme Court. Significantly, the State 
does not contest the fact that claims involving juror misconduct or other claims stemming 
from affidavits provided by jurors, are appropriately raised in post-conviction 
proceedings. However, the district court's order effectively prevents Mr. Hall from 
identifying, raising, and supporting such claims. 
3. The District Court's Order Violates Mr. Hall's Right To Meaningful Post-
Conviction Proceedings In A Capital Case As Guaranteed By The Due 
Process Clauses And The Eighth Amendment To The U.S. Constitution 
Relying on Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 17 P.3d 230 (2000), the State asserts 
that this Court should not consider the constitutional stakes at risk between non-capital 
and capital cases when assessing whether the district court's rule violates the Eighth 
Amendment. Fields is inapposite for three reasons. First, Fields dealt with a discovery 
issue; this Court has never equated jury contact issues with discovery issues. Second, 
Fields arose in the context of a successive petition; this Court has upheld the statute 
placing far greater obstacles on a petitioner's ability to raise claims in successive 
petitions than in original petitions. Of course, Mr. Hall's case is pending in an original 
post-conviction proceeding. Third, Fields actually demonstrates why the district court's 
standard is not appropriate in the context of post-verdict juror interviews. As stated by 
the Court: 
Through additional discovery, Fields sought to develop the conflict of 
interest issue, as well as evidence in mitigation. 
The information Fields sought was unlikely to be contained in the 
prosecutor's files. Furthermore, the potential evidence would be generated 
more probably through the continuing efforts of Fields and his 
representatives. The district court's denial of the discovery request does 
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not prevent further investigation on Fields' behalf, and more importantly, 
does not deny Fields any substantial rights. The district court's decision 
not to grant additional discovery is hereby affirmed. 
Fields, 135 Idaho at 291, 17 P.3d at 235. Here, the information Mr. Hall seeks is likely to 
be possessed by the jurors; the information will not, more probably, be generated through 
continued investigation; and the district court's order effectively prevents any further 
meaningful investigation. 
C. Conclusion 
The district court created a rule severely restricting juror contact where juror 
contact had previously been self-regulated by the legal profession through the Idaho 
Rules of Professional Conduct, the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions, the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence, and case law. It impugns the integrity of the Idaho legal profession to 
presume, as the district court did, that post-conviction counsel will violate their 
obligations to the profession. By crafting an unprecedented and unwarranted order, the 
district court unnecessarily infringed on Mr. Hall's rights to free speech, to meaningful 
post-conviction proceedings, and to the additional safeguards afforded capital defendants. 
Accordingly, Mr. Hall respectfully requests this Court vacate the district court's order 
prohibiting juror contact. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Forbidding Mr. Hall's Attorneys And Their 
Agents From Contacting Any Of The Jurors 
A. Introduction 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Hall asserts that the district court lacked the 
authority to enter an order prohibiting his counsel from contacting any of the jurors. 
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Assuming arguendo that the district court had the authority to enter its order, Mr. Hall 
asserts that he met the standard established by the district court. In response, the State 
claims the district court had inherent authority to enter its order, and did not abuse its 
discretion by prohibiting jury contact. 
B. The District Court Lacked The Authority To Enter Its Order 
The State asserts that Mr. HaIl assumed in his opening brief that the district court 
had inherent authority to limit jury contact. (Respondent's Brief, p.26.) While Mr. Hall 
argued in the alternative, assuming arguendo that the district court had inherent authority, 
Mr. Hall also maintained that the court lacked authority to enter its order. For instance, 
Mr. Hall presented the following argument: 
Mr. Hall submits that absent any evidence his attorneys or their agents 
committed (or intended to commit) misconduct, the district court exceeded 
its authority by entering its order .... Under Idaho law, it is the sole 
province of the Idaho Supreme Court to create rules governing the practice 
and procedure in all Idaho courts, including the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
IDAHO CONST. ART. V, § 2; Idaho Code § 1-212. Such rules cannot be 
interpreted by inferior courts to "abridge, enlarge or modify the 
substantive rights of any litigant." I.C. § 1-213. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.25.) The district court's order abridged or otherwise modified Mr. 
HaIl's right to investigate, raise, and support potential claims for post-conviction relief by 
placing additional restrictions, and ultimately a complete prohibition, on his counsels' 
ability to interview jurors. 
Moreover, assuming arguendo that the district court has inherent authority to 
impose restrictions, or an absolute prohibition, on jury contact, Mr. Hall submits that the 
district court, under the circumstances of this case, was not entitled to invoke such 
authority. Indeed, this Court has recognized that even in cases where trial courts 
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generally possess inherent authority to act, proper invocation of such authority is 
dependent upon the particular circumstances of the case. For instance, in State v. Rogers, 
143 Idaho 320, 144 P.3d 25 (2006), this Court affirmed a trial court's inherent authority 
to assess sanctions for bad faith conduct against all parties appearing before it. However, 
this Court held that under the circumstances of that case, the trial court was not entitled to 
invoke such authority. Specifically, the Court held that the trial court "did not act 
consistently with the applicable legal standards" for invoking such authority, i.e., 
ordering sanctions, because the attorney did not engage in improper conduct. Id. at 322-
23, 144 P.3d at 27-28. Similarly, the district court in Mr. Hall's case "did not act 
consistently with the applicable legal standards" for invoking such authority, i.e., 
ordering restrictions on jury contact, because Mr. Hall's attorneys did not engage in 
improper conduct. Mr. Hall's attorneys had not violated any court order or rule, most 
notably Rule 3.5(c) of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 606(b) of the 
Idaho Rules of Evidence. Indeed, Mr. Hall's attorneys acted consistently with those rules 
as well as this Court's proposed jury instructions. 
The State concedes that Mr. Hall's proposed contact was not improper. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.29 ("[T]he state concedes there was no evidence establishing 
Hall's attorneys or agents were involved in or intended to commit misconduct .... ").) 
Notably, the State relies on this Court's promulgation of proposed jury instructions as 
support for its contention that the district court properly invoked its inherent authority. 
The relevant instruction provides as follows: 
The question may arise as to whether you may discuss this case with the 
attorneys or with anyone else. For your guidance, the Court instructs you 
that whether you talk to the attorneys, or to anyone else, is entirely your 
own decision. It is proper for you to discuss this case, if you wish to, but 
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you are not required to do so, and you may choose not to discuss the case 
with anyone at all. If you choose to, you may tell them as much or as little 
as you like, but you should be careful to respect the privacy and feelings 
of your fellow jurors. Remember that they understood their deliberations 
to be confidential. Therefore, you should limit your comments to your 
own perceptions and feelings. If anyone persists in discussing the case 
over your objection, or becomes critical of your service, either before 
or after any discussion has begun, please report it to me. 
(See Respondent's Brief, p.28 (quoting Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 232) (emphasis 
added).) Thus, the Court's jury instructions provide for the district court's invocation of 
inherent authority "if anyone harasses the jurors". Indeed, Mr. Hall concedes that if a 
juror reports an instance of misconduct, then a district court may take action placing 
reasonable restrictions on any further contact, which in some circumstances, may warrant 
a complete prohibition on any further contact. 
The State claims that the district court properly invoked its inherent authority to 
create a rule, based in part on the discovery rule, requiring attorneys to demonstrate that 
jury contact is necessary to protect the petitioner's substantial rights. (Respondent's 
Brief, p.29.) To support its contention that the district court adopted an appropriate rule, 
the State mischaracterizes the record by stating that Mr. Hall brought a motion for 
discovery. (Respondent's Brief, p.29 ("Hall's contention that he 'did not ask the court to 
order jury interviews through discovery' ... is untrue .... that is exactly what he did by 
filing his Motion for Jury Contact.").) The State makes this claim despite conceding that 
the district court prohibited Mr. Hall from contacting jurors without first bringing a 
motion. (Respondent's Brief, p.3 ("[I]t was clear the court did not want Hall's attorneys 
contacting jurors 'without coming back with a specific motion. "'); pA (noting that the 
district court informed Mr. Hall that he "need[ ed] prior express permission from the 
Court" before contacting any of the jurors).) Further, the State makes this claim despite 
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conceding that Mr. Hall consistently maintained that the district court had no authority to 
prohibit jury contact. (Respondent's Brief, p.5 (quoting Mr. Hall's counsel as stating, 
"[TJhere's no support in law. Again, there's nothing prohibiting us from contacting these 
people.").) Finally, as noted above, Mr. Hall filed a separate motion for discovery that 
did not include a request for juror interviews. In short, while conceding that the district 
court's prior rulings are "interesting and important background," the State ignores both 
when characterizing Mr. Hall's motion for jury contact. 
The State claims that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying its 
chosen standard. The State relies in part on cases it previously cited to support its 
contention that "courts have properly exercised their right to protect jurors from 
unwanted post-trial harassment." (Respondent's Brief, pp.29-30 (emphasis added).) 
There are two problems with the State's claim. First, it has not been established that the 
jurors in this case objected to any communications with Mr. Hall's attorneys, or that any 
attempt to contact them constituted harassment. Second, not a single case cited by the 
State adopted the rule or standard imposed by the district court. As noted above, the 
majority of the cases relied upon by the State have adopted a lower standard for 
permitting jury contact; in the respective jurisdictions, attorneys need only demonstrate 
good or just cause for contacting jurors. 
The State relies heavily on Townsel v. Superior Court, 979 P.2d 963 (Cal. 1999), 
asserting that the case is "remarkably similar" to the case at bar. (Respondent's Brief, 
p.31.) While the procedural history is similar, a careful reading of Townsel demonstrates 
that California has adopted a rule requiring a showing of "good cause," a rule more 
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stringent than unrestricted access but much less stringent than the rule adopted by the 
district court in Mr. Hall's case. As explained by the Townsel court: 
We must still decide whether respondent abused its discretion in ordering 
appellate counsel to have no contact with the jurors without first showing 
"good cause" or "probable cause" for such contact and receiving court 
approval. In the circumstances of this trial we conclude the trial court 
acted within its discretion. 
To begin with, this was a capital trial, and defendant was found guilty and 
sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Further, it appears that defendant 
was convicted of murdering one victim because she was a witness to a 
previous crime ... and that he was also convicted of attempting to prevent 
or dissuade a witness. Each of these circumstances raises serious concerns 
about juror safety .... 
In addition, several years-almost a decade-have now passed since the jury 
returned its verdict. This long period of repose will have heightened the 
jurors' sense of privacy regarding Townsel's trial, likely making any 
present contact by appellate counsel both startling and more intrusive .... 
Townsel, 979 P.2d at 970-71 (footnotes omitted). While Mr. Hall was convicted of capital 
murder, there was no allegation that he presented a threat to witnesses. In addition, 
because Idaho capital post-conviction proceedings are initiated almost immediately 
following a death sentence, in Mr. Hall's case there was not a significant passage of time 
that could conceivably heighten a juror's sense of privacy or diminish a juror's 
recollection. 
After concluding that restrictions were appropriate, the Townsel court approved a 
procedure which deviates significantly from the procedure adopted by the district court in 
Mr. Hall's case. As stated by the court: 
Under these circumstances, respondent did not abuse its discretion in 
requiring that appellate counsel approach jurors through the court. In this 
way, the court can act as a neutral third party, serving to apprise the jurors 
of counsel's interest and to determine, in the first instance, if a juror will 
consent to an interview with appellate counsel. If any juror refuses to 
consent, that is the end of the matter. If, however, a juror consents to an 
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interview, no more need be shown, as section 206, subdivision (a) 
provides that jurors enjoy "an absolute right to discuss ... the deliberation 
or verdict with anyone." If a juror does consent to an interview, 
respondent court would abuse its discretion by requiring counsel to 
make a showing of need or "good cause" greater than the desire to 
interview the juror for a lawful purpose. (Cf. § 206, subd. (f) [defense 
counsel may petition for disclosure of juror identifying information if 
necessary for "any ... lawful purpose"].) In this circumstance, investigating 
the possibility of juror misconduct for presentation in a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus is a lawful purpose. 
Id. at 971 (footnotes omitted)(emphasis added). 
The State conducts a cursory review of the justifications offered by Mr. Hall to 
support his request for jury contact, concluding that a cursory review is sufficient to 
establish that Mr. Hall was merely on a "fishing expedition." (Respondent's Brief, p.32.) 
Contrary to the State's assertions, Mr. Hall demonstrated that he pursued jury contact for 
proper and specific purposes, sufficient to establish even the onerous standard adopted by 
the district court. 
Mr. Hall identified several areas of general inquiry for the jurors, including but 
not limited to, the following: their knowledge of undisclosed witnesses; their awareness 
of Mr. Hall's shackles; their exposure to pretrial publicity; and their consideration of 
exercise of his constitutional right not to testify. (R. 35055, Exhibit 12, pp. 12-17.) The 
State summarily concludes that Mr. Hall's general inquiries, in their totality, would lead 
to harassment and intimidation. (Respondent's Brief, p.33.) The State's summary 
conclusion is difficult to reconcile with its earlier concession that "there was no evidence 
establishing Hall's attorneys or agents were involved in or intended to commit 
misconduct .... " (Respondent's Brief, p.29.) Significantly, none of the general inquiries 
would have implicated the exclusionary provisions of LR.E. 606(b). In other words, 
there is no indication that Mr. Hall would have even sought to interview the jurors over 
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their objections or discuss their deliberations for the purpose of obtaining inadmissible 
evidence. Thus, the primary policies underlying the rule, i.e., the goverument interest in 
protecting jurors from harassment and preserving the sanctity of jury deliberations, were 
not implicated by Mr. Hall's general inquiries. 
Moreover, Mr. Hall identified specific inquiries that were targeted at known 
irregularities that occurred during the jury selection process and the trial. (R. 35055, 
Exhibit 12, pp. 12-26.) Even the State concedes that "[Mr.] Hall's 'specific' questions 
are linked with questions raised during voir dire." (Respondent's Brief, p.34.) However, 
the State claims that Mr. Hall's proposed inquiries about undisclosed witnesses were not 
related to claims he raised in his amended petition. (Respondent's Brief, p.32 ("[E]ven if 
a juror had 'knowledge of and relationship to an undisclosed witness,' Hall completely 
failed to explain how such a finding was related to his amended petition . . .. ").) Of 
course, the record is clear that prior to entering its order prohibiting juror contact the 
district court never informed Mr. Hall that it intended to adopt a standard similar to the 
standard governing post-conviction discovery, i.e., a standard that would require explicit 
reference to claims raised in the petition. Nevertheless, Mr. Hall explained the 
relationship between his inquiries and his claims in part as follows: 
Juror (83) 
[Juror 83's] husband was a Deputy Attorney General assigned to represent 
the Idaho Department of Corrections. 
Mr. Hall should also be allowed to specifically inquire whether this juror 
knew Attorney General Jay Rosenthal. Trial counsel did not notice that 
Mr. Rosenthal had not been disclosed as a State witness in the jury 
questionnaire, and acknowledged that [Juror 83] should have been asked 
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whether she knew Mr. Rosenthal. (9/14/06 Deposition of Amil Myshin, 
p.27l, L.6 - p.272, L.4.) Mr. Rosenthal was a key State witness at 
sentencing but, as discussed above, was not disclosed as a witness on the 
jury questionnaires. Mr. Rosenthal, like (Juror 83's) husband, is a Deputy 
Attorney General for the State of Idaho. Petitioner must be allowed to 
determine whether (Juror 83) knew Mr. Rosenthal and whether she made 
credibility determinations based on Mr. Rosenthal's occupation or 
personal acquaintance. 
(R. 35055, Exhibit 12, pp. 19-22.) (Footnote omitted.) 
Similarly, Mr. Hall established the relationship between his inquiries about the 
jurors' awareness, if any, of his shackles in his Final Amended Petition. (R. 35055 Vol. 
VII, p.l273.) In support of this claim, Mr. Hall stated in relevant part the following: 
Mr. Hall wore a "leg brace" during all court appearances. (Tr., p.592.) 
According to the State, the brace was worn under clothing, but would lock 
whenever Mr. Hall stood and his leg would remain stiff, unless he pressed 
a button to the side of the brace that released it. (Tr., p.592, Ls.7-l5.) Mr. 
Hall would have to push the button as he walked. (Tr., p. 593, Ls. 4-6.) 
This was a new device that the Court had never previously employed. (Tr., 
p. 592, Ls. 23-24.) The Court made no findings whether the device was 
detectable and no findings whether the device was necessary. 
The jurors were able to discern that Mr. Hall was shackled during the guilt 
phase and penalty phase of his trial. First, the leg device made clicking 
noises which the jurors would have been able to hear each time he stood 
up before the court. Second, in order to return to a seated position, Mr. 
Hall had to press a button on the device, which also would have been 
noticeable by the jurors. The jury was therefore aware that court 
authorities considered him a danger to the community, inevitably affecting 
their perception of Mr. Hall. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2014 (reasoning that 
shackling almost inevitably implies to a jury, as a matter of common 
sense, that court authorities consider the offender a danger to the 
community, and shackling almost inevitably affects adversely the jury's 
perception of the character of the defendant). Mr. Hall relies on his 
affidavit, to be submitted, to establish this matter, as the district 
court's refusal to allow post-conviction counsel to interview jurors 
precludes Mr. Hall from otherwise fully developing this claim. (See 
Tr., 12/8/06, deposition of D.C. Carr, p. 309 (explaining he would have 
missed any noises made by the leg device because he has "high frequency 
loss" of hearing).) 
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(R. 35055 Vol. VII, pp.22 1-223 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added)l 
C. Conclusion 
The district court lacked inherent authority to create a rule that abridged and 
modified Mr. Hall's right to conduct a meaningful post-conviction investigation 
consistent with existing Court rules and regulations. Assuming arguendo the district 
court had the inherent authority to regulate juror interviews, under the circumstances of 
this case, the court was not entitled to invoke that authority. Finally, assuming the court 
properly invoked its authority, the court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Hall's 
request for juror contact. 
III. 
The District Court's Order Denying Mr. Hall's Motion For A Court-Ordered Deposition 
Of His Trial Counsels' Investigator, Glenn Elam, Constitutes An Abuse Of Discretion 
Where Mr. Hall Has Demonstrated That A Deposition 
Is Necessary To Protect His Substantial Rights 
A. Introduction 
In his opening brief, Mr. Hall claims that the district court erred in denying his 
motion to depose his trial connsels' investigator, Glenn Elam. Mr. Hall provided 
evidence demonstrating that Mr. Elam's testimony was necessary to establish the scope 
of the investigation conducted in relationship to his claims for post-conviction relief. Mr. 
Hall asserts that he made a sufficient showing to establish that requested deposition was 
2 Mr. Hall subsequently attached his own affidavit in support of this claim. (R. 35055 
Vol. VII, p.l377 (providing in part that, "[t]he [leg] brace made clicking noises; the 
jurors would have been able to hear these noises every time I stood up.") Accordingly, if 
Mr. Hall had not previously made the showing necessary to justify post-conviction juror 
interviews, then he now has for purposes of this appeal and for purposes of any additional 
factual findings that the district court might make upon remand. 
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mandatory. Alternatively, Mr. Hall asserts that the district court abused its discretion in 
denying his request for the deposition based on the court's misapplication of the relevant 
facts and law. (Appellant's Brief, pp.27-37.) 
In its response, the State asserts that the district court did not err by denying Mr. 
Hall's motion for three reasons: 1) claims Mr. Elam's testimony was only relevant to "a 
single claim" in his petition; 2) because Mr. Hall deposed trial counsel, he did not need to 
depose Mr. EJam; and 3) Mr. Hall did not demonstrate that he could not obtain an 
affidavit ofMr. Elam in lieu of his deposition. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7, 11-15.) 
In this reply, Mr. Hall will demonstrate that both of the State s assertions are 
based on mischaracterizations of the record. 
B. The District Court's Order Denying Mr. Hall's Motion For A Court-Ordered 
Deposition Of His Trial Counsels' Investigator, Glenn Elam, Constitutes An 
Abuse Of Discretion Where Mr. Hall Has Demonstrated That A Deposition Is 
Necessary To Protect His Substantial Rights 
1. The Deposition Of Glenn Elam Was Necessary To Fully Support Claims 
Raised In Mr. Hall's Petition For Post-Conviction Relief, Including A 
Claim That His Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing 
To Adequately Investigate And Present Evidence Of An Alternate 
Perpetrator 
The State correctly notes that Mr. Hall claims that the district court abused its 
discretion by denying the deposition of Glenn Elam where such deposition was necessary 
to fully develop a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). However, according to the State, Mr. Hall never 
raised such a claim in his petition, and therefore should be precluded from making such 
an argument on appeal. (Respondent's Brief, p.lI ("But the portion of the amended 
petition upon which Hall relies - claim D. 7 involves a claim that the state allegedly 
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withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).") 
The State concludes: 
Hall's attempt to now change the claim from a Brady violation to an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim to support his request to depose 
Elam cannot be countenanced by this Court and demonstrates his true 
purpose in deposing Elam was to embark on a fishing expedition to raise 
new claims for his final amended petition. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.ll.) 
Contrary to the State's assertion, Mr. Hall did in fact raise a Strickland claim 
based on his trial counsels' failure to adequately investigate and present evidence of an 
alternate perpetrator in both his amended and final petitions. (R. 35055 Vol. II, p.l52; R. 
35055 Vol. VI, pp.l089-96; Vol. VII, p.1347 ("Trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance of counsel during the guilt-innocence phase of trial by failing to conduct an 
adequate investigation of the possible connection between Lynn Henneman's murder and 
Patrick Hoffert's suicide.").) Apparently the State is confused by the fact that Mr. Hall 
also raised a separate but related Brady claim. (R. 35055 Vol. I, pp.l90-92.) Notably, 
when stating his Strickland claim in his amended petition, rather than restate the 
overlapping evidence from the earlier Brady claim, Mr. Hall simply incorporated by 
reference the factual development set forth in the earlier claim. (R. 35055 Vol. II, p.l52 
("Had trial counsel conducted an adequate investigation, they would have discovered 
evidence linking Patrick Hoffert to the crime. See supra, claim D-7, incorporated 
herein by reference.") (emphasis added).) Thus, Mr. Hall is not attempting to raise a 
Strickland claim for the first time on appeal. Consequently, the State's characterizations 
about the record and the State's allegations about post-conviction counsels' hidden and 
nefarious agendas are both mistaken and misplaced. (Respondent's Brief, p.l5 ("Hall's 
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sole purpose in deposing Elam is to fish for new claims that are not part of his amended 
or final post-conviction petitions, or simply to increase the costs associated with his post-
conviction case .... ").) Thus, the Court need not countenance anything to hold that the 
district court abused its discretion by preventing Mr. Hall from deposing Mr. Elam.3 
2. The Depositions Of Glenn Elam Was Necessary To Establish The Full 
Scope Of Trial Counsels' Investigation Relevant To Mr. Hall's Claim 
That Trial Counsel Failed To Adequately Investigate And Present 
Evidence Of An Alternate Perpetrator 
The State claims that the depositions of trial counsel demonstrate that Glenn Elam 
could not have provided more information about his investigation than was revealed in 
trial counsels' depositions. Notably, the State quotes Mr. Hall's lead trial counsel, Ami! 
Myshin, as stating that Mr. Elam' s interviews of two witnesses, Peggy Hill and Lisa 
Lewis, revealed nothing more than what had been disclosed in police reports. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.12-13.) However, as demonstrated by the affidavit of Michael 
Shaw, post-conviction counsels' investigator, Mr. Elam discovered much more than what 
Mr. Myshin recalled in his deposition, and much more than what the police reports 
3 The State characterizes Mr. Hall's discovery request as a "fishing expedition" without 
regard for the facts in the record and attributes the costs and delays associated with this 
case to post-conviction counsel, without providing a thoughtful analysis of why this case 
has taken so long to litigate. Indeed, if the district court had granted the requested 
deposition, then the deposition could have been completed years ago. Likewise, because 
the State below and now on appeal refuses to recognize the propriety of the requested 
deposition, this interlocutory appeal has unnecessarily delayed the underlying post-
conviction proceedings. Mr. Hall finds no fault with this Court for granting this appeal. 
Indeed, if the Court had not granted this appeal, then there would have been even greater 
costs and delay for the case to proceed through a consolidated appeal only to be 
remanded, at a minimum, for further post-conviction proceedings at some much later 
future date. Mr. Hall does not attribute the State's mischaracterizations of the record or 
its incomplete analysis to bad faith. During these proceedings, the State cited a heavy 
caseload as support for multiple extensions of its briefing deadline. It is widely 
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provided. Most notably, Mr. Elam learned through his investigation that Patrick Hoffert 
had been seen with Lynn Henneman on the day she was raped and murdered, that Mr. 
Hoffert had committed suicide by a self-inflicted gunshot wound the day after the rape 
and murder, and that Mr. Hoffert had purportedly claimed to have "raped the girl" 
immediately before shooting himself. (Appellant's Brief, pp.28-29.) Significantly, the 
State fails to note that later in his deposition, Mr. Myshin testified that he was not aware 
of these additional facts, and that had he known, he "may have changed what [he] did" at 
trial. (R. 35055, Exhibit 15 containing Exhibit 14 to Mr. Hall's Final Amended Petition 
(Tr., 11/16/06 deposition of Amil Myshin, p.413, 1.20 - p.415, L.14.).) 
3. The Deposition Of Glenn Elam Was Necessary Due To Mr. Elam's 
Refusal To Sign An Affidavit 
The State claims that "there was no allegation that Myshin or Elam were trying to 
avoid giving or obtaining permission to sign an affidavit or otherwise be[ing] 
uncooperative." (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) This is simply untrue. Indeed, Mr. Hall's 
post-conviction counsel informed the district court, and provided a sworn statement from 
his investigator, that Mr. Elam had refused to sign an affidavit because Mr. Myshin had 
not provided him consent to do so. (R. 35055, Exhibit 13 containing Appendix II to Mr. 
Hall's Motion for Permission to Appeal, pp.I-3).) Further, Mr. Hall subsequently 
attached an amended affidavit from Mr. Shaw to his final amended petition. (See R. 
35055 Vol. VI, pp.1055-56, pp.1093-95.) The amended affidavit included all the 
information provided to the district court in the motion for permissive appeal, filed on 
August 23, 2007, as well as the following: 
recognized that an excessive caseload can undermine the performance of even otherwise 
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On August 31, 2007, 1 saw Mr. Myshin outside the Ada County 
Courthouse and told him that Mr. Elam would not sign an affidavit 
without his consent. When I asked Mr. Myshin whether he would consent 
to Mr. Elam giving the State Appellate Public Defender's Office an 
affidavit in the Hall case, Mr. Myshin stated, "1 wish you would leave him 
alone." 
CR. 35055, Exhibit 15 containing Exhibit 36 to Mr. Hall's Final Amended Petition, pA.) 
Accordingly, if Mr. Hall had not previously established the lack of cooperation by Mr. 
Elam and his trial counsel, then there can be little question now that he has for purposes 
of this appeal and for purposes of any additional factual findings that the district court 
might make upon remand. 
C. Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, a deposition of Mr. Elam appears to be the only way 
to obtain all the information necessary to fully support Mr. Hall's claims. Accordingly, 
Mr. Hall submits that the district court erred in denying his request to depose Mr. Elam. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hall respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's orders 
denying his motion for juror contact and to depose Mr. Elam, and remand this case for 
further investigation and proceedings. 
effective advocates. CR. 35005 VoI.VI, p.l155-56.) 
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